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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
-V.-

Utah Court of Appeals

ALL REAL PROPERTY, RESIDENCE &
APPURTENANCES LOCATED AT 736
NORTH COLORADO STREET, SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116,

Case No. 20030367 CA
Trial Court No. 970903755 CV

Defendant.
BRUCE PETERSEN,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE, STATE OF UTAH

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellee State of Utah will track the designations as given in Appellant's
Brief: Interested Party/Appellant, Bruce Petersen will be referred to as Petersen
and Plaintiff/Appellee State of Utah will be referred to as State, with the other
designations as outlined by Petersen also being adopted.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over all cases transferred from
the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Constitution art. VII, § 5, and Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure 3.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE: Did the Trial Court Properly Deny Petersen's Second
Motion to Set Aside Judgment Where Petersen Based his Motion on a
Procedural Issue That Was Not Originally Raised and Was Thus Waived?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. Black's Title Inc. v.
Utah State Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Kate
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986).
SECOND ISSUE: Does the Forfeiture of Real Property That Is
Proceeds of Narcotic Activity Involve a Deprivation of Liberty Interest,
Where Liberty Interest Refers Only to Personal Liberty Under Case Law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Review for correctness. Coulter & Smith,
LTD. V. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d
736, 739 (Utah 1982); Provo City Corp. v. Neilson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1979).
THIRD ISSUE: Does the Forfeiture of Real Property That Represents
Proceeds of Narcotic Activity Invoke An Exceptional Circumstance When
Petersen Had Ample Opportunity to Raise the Rule 4 Issue at Both Trial and
Appellate Levels?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Review for correctness. Coulter & Smith,
LTD. V. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d

2

736, 739 (Utah 1982); Provo City Corp. v. Neilson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1979).
FOURTH ISSUE: Did the Trial Court Properly Deny the Second
Motion to Set Aside Judgment Where the Original Service of Process and
Subsequent Judgment Followed the Proscribed Service Requirements,
Petersen Failed to Answer, Judgment Was Granted, Motions to Set Aside
Were Heard and Denied, an Appeal Taken, and the Rulings Affirmed?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. Black's Title Inc. v.
Utah State Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Katz
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertain and
appear in full text in the argument section or addendum, or within and cited to
Petersen's Addendum:
UTAH CONST., art. VII, § 5.
UtahR. App. P. 10.
Utah R.Civ. P. 1
Utah R.Civ. P. 4
Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (b) and (h)
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b).
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-13(2)
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-13(9)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature of the Case:

This is an appeal from a ruling and Order Denying Petersen's Second
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. Judge Henriod's order denying the
Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment was based upon the failure of Petersen to
raise his Rule 4 service of process issue at the original trial and appellate levels,
consequent waiver of the issue, and a contravention of judicial economy and the
appellate process. (See Ex. A & B). This case was previously heard by this Court
of Appeals based upon a similar attack on service. Upon that hearing, this Court
affirmed the original order of default judgment, and the denial of Claimant's (first)
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, finding that service was proper under applicable
statutes.
B.

Course of Proceedings:

The State is satisfied with Petersen's statement of course of proceedings.
C.

Disposition in the Trial Court Below:

The Trial Court denied Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment,
filed after this Court of Appeals ruled that service of process was proper under
governing statutes in the original trial proceeding.
D.

Plenary Statement of Facts:

1.

On or about May 14, 1997, the defendant property, consisting of

Appellant's home and real estate located at 736 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake
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City, Utah, was seized incident to the execution of search and seizure warrants,
incident to the discovery of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory located on
and in the home and property. The search and seizure warrant was issued by the
Third District Court, Judge Michael Hutchings.
2.

Based upon a belief by the DEA/Metro Narcotics Task Force and by

the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office that the defendant property was
forfeitable, a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture was filed by the State, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (Supp. 1996) against the seized home and real
property on May 30, 1997. (Record, [hereafter "R."] 1).
3.

On or about May 30, 1997, a copy of the Verified Complaint for

Forfeiture in this matter, along with a Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit
was mailed, pursuant to statute, to all persons who appeared to be interested
parties, at their respective last known addresses. This included Beehive Bail
Bonds at 268 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Petersen at 736 North
Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 25).
4.

On or about June 4, 2003, a Lis Pendens was also recorded with the

County Recorder's Office, and on June 13, that Lis Pendens was filed. (R. 6).
5.

Knowing that Appellant's mail was requested forwarded, the United

States Postal Service changed the mailing address of the certified mail for the
Appellant to 626 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 25).
6.

By affidavit, Petersen acknowledges that he was residing at 626

North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah from February 8, 1997 through June

23, 1997, during the time certified mailing of the Notice and complaint were left
and went unclaimed. (R. 41).
7.

The certified mail sent to the Appellant's correct and actual address

of 626 North Colorado Street was returned after the United States Postal Service
left notice of the certified mail on three separate occasions. (R. 25).
8.

An application for the entry of the default of the non-answering

Appellant and Beehive Bail Bonds was thereafter submitted to the Court, and the
respective defaults of each of the potential interested parties was entered by the
Court on August 11, 1997. (R. 15-16). Thereafter, Judgment of Forfeiture was
entered against all potential interested parties, including Appellant, on August 11,
1997. (R. 11-12).
9.

On November 4, 1997, a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was

filed by Mark T. Ethington on behalf of the Appellant. (R. 20). A memorandum
in support thereof was never submitted, nor was any request for decision advanced
by Mr. Ethington on Appellant's behalf. (R. 20).
10.

On November 12, 1999, Mr. Wall entered his formal appearance

herein, and filed a memorandum in support of the November 4, 1997 Motion to
Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 26).
11.

On December 2, 1999, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition

to Motion to Vacate Judgment by Default. (R. 45).

12.

On December 27, 1999, the Third District Court, Judge Stephen L.

Henriod, presiding, issued a minute entry in which the Court denied Appellant's
Motion to Vacate Default Judgment. (R. 54).
13.

On January 5, 2000, the State submitted proposed Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, as well as a proposed Order denying the Motion to
Vacate the Default Judgment. (R. 56).
14.

On January 11, 2000, the Court, Judge Henriod presiding, adopted as

its own, signed and entered the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. (R. 56 - 61).
15.

On January 13, 2000, a Motion for Reconsideration or in the

Alternative to Make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with an
accompanying memorandum was filed by Appellant. (R. 66).
16.

On February 3, 2000, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition

to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 72).
17.

On February 18, 2000, Appellant filed a "Response to Plaintiffs

Memorandum in Opposition to Bruce Peterson's Motion for Reconsideration".
(R. 79).
18.

On March 8, 2000, the Court issued a Minute Entry, summarily

denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make
Alternative Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Request for Hearing,
without any finding. (R. 93).
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19.

On August 21, 2000, the Court entered its Order Denying Bruce

Peterson's Motion For Reconsideration. (R. 95).
20.

On August 31, 2000, the parties hereto entered into a Stipulation, in

which the State agreed that the time for filing an appeal from the Court's January
11, 2000 Order Denying Bruce Peterson's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment
would commence on August 31, 2000, the date of the entry of the Court's Order
Denying Bruce Peterson's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 98).
21.

On September 18, 2001, Petersen filed his (first) notice of Appeal.

(R. 100).
22.

On November 29, 2001, this Court held that the State's Service of

the Notice of Seizure and Intent to Forfeit were properly served on Petersen
through certified mailing. (R. 111-115).
23.

On March 5, 2002, Petersen filed a Second Motion to Set Aside

Judgment, with supporting Memorandum and Attachments, at the trial court level.
(R. 117-143).
24.

On March 21, 2002, the State filed its Memorandum in Opposition

to (Second) Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 148-156).
25.

On February 11, 2003, Petersen filed a Reply Memorandum. (R.

159-165).
26.

On March 18, 2003, Third District Judge Stephen L. Henriocl issued

a minute entry denying Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R.
168-169).
8

27.

On March 28, 2003, Third District Court, Judge Stephen L. Henriod

presiding, issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying
Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 171-174).
28.

On April 21, 2003, Petersen filed his (second) Notice of Appeal

from Judge Henriod's denial of the Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R.
175-176).
29.

On or about May 28, 2003, the State filed a Motion for Summary

Disposition.
30.

On or about July 10, 2003, Petersen filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition.
31.

On October 21, 2003, this Court denied the State's Motion for

Summary Disposition.
SUMMARY ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Petersen's second
motion to set aside judgment based upon defective service was improperly brought
because the issue was not originally raised and was therefore waived under Utah
law. What is more, the default judgment of forfeiture does not involve a
deprivation of liberty interest or exceptional circumstances, and therefore cannot
create an exception that would allow review of Petersen's new attack on service of
process. As the trial court noted, to allow Petersen to re-start the action by
bringing new issues after having the opportunity to raise them at trial and appellate
levels would be a contravention of judicial economy and the appellate process.

9

Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petersen's
Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment because the service of process was proper
under the service rules promulgated by our legislature for these civil in rem
forfeitures; the service was in fact appropriate to the nature of the case; and, this
Court had already held that the service of process was proper and that Petersen had
waived the newer service argument. Therefore, the trial court order denying
Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside should be affirmed.
The State also renews its motion for summary disposition pursuant 1o Rule
10(f) following plenary presentation and consideration of the case.
PLENARY ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PETERSEN'S SECOND
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE MOTION
WAS BASED UPON A PROCEDURAL ISSUE THAT WAS NOT
ORIGINALLY RAISED AND WAS THUS WAIVED
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Petersen's Second
Motion to Set Aside Judgment because the attack Petersen sought to bring,
namely defective personal service under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Rule 4") (Petersen's Addendum A), was not properly raised at the
original trial and appellate levels, and was properly deemed waived for failure to
raise under Utah Law.
It is important to note that the trial court's denial of Petersen's second
motion came following review of extensive pleadings, and this Court's own

10

decision determining that the attack on service of process had been waived. See
All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 277 fn 4 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). The trial court's
decision is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, Black's Title Inc.
v. Utah State Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999);
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), and for the reasons discussed cannot
be considered an abuse of discretion.
The Utah Court of Appeals made clear in its original decision affirming the
August 11, 1997 order of default judgment that the very grounds Petersen raises
here have been waived. After determining that personal service was not required
under the plain language of the forfeiture statute and that the original service of
process was proper, this Court noted in footnote 4 that Petersen's alternate
personal service argument could not be addressed for failure to raise. Footnote 4
of that decision stated:
For claimant to raise the issue of defective service of the complaint on
appeal, he must have raised it below. See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa &
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1066-1067 (Utah 1991); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 12
(h) (stating lack of jurisdiction for defective service can be waived).
Claimant has also failed to argue plain error or exceptional circumstances
on appeal. Accordingly, we cannot address the argument. See State v.
Helmick, 2000 UT 70, | 8, 9 P.3d 164.
State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 278, FN4 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Rather
than take instruction from the footnote, Petersen treats the footnote as an invitation
to litigate ad infinitum, at the cost of fair judicial process.
That Petersen's alternate service of process argument is waived is clear
under Utah rules of procedure and case law. Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b) and (h) provides:

n

(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required,
except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion: ... (5) insufficiency of service of process....
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply....
In Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court considered Rule 12 and the question of whether the defense of
insufficiency of service of process is one that becomes waived for failure to raise.
That Court held:
It is evident that the policy of Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is to require all such motions to be presented for decision early
and all at the same time so as to promote judicial efficiency and to reduce
litigation expenses. We therefore hold that the affirmative defense of
defective service of process is barred by waiver.
Also dispositive of the affirmative defense issue is the failure on the part of
Foa to specifically raise the issue of defective service of process at the time
of the summary judgment hearing.
Id. at 1067.
Given the foregoing analysis and rule of law, the trial court below properly
denied Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment when it concluded that
Petersen had waived the personal service argument, and that his attempt at rerestarting the case under that modified attack would frustrate judicial economy and
the appellate process. For these reasons the trial court's decision was not an abuse
of discretion, and this Court should affirm the denial of Petersen's Second Motion
to Set Aside Judgment.
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POINT II
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A LIBERTY INTEREST THAT
PERMITS A REVIEW OF PETERSEN'S LATELY STYLED
ATTACK ON THE 1997 SERVICE OF PROCESS
This Court should affirm the trial court's order denying Petersen's new
motion to set aside based on service of process because this case in no way
involves a deprivation of liberty interest that would allow him to raise the issue
now. In an unpublished opinion1, this Court defined a liberty interest, stating
"[s]tate-created liberty interests ... are 'generally limited to freedom from restraint
which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give
rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes
atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.'" Straley v. Galetka, 2000 UT App 348, citing Perkins v.
Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 805, 808 (10th Cir.1999) quoting Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (provided as Ex. C).
Petersen errs when suggesting that the forfeiture of real property linked to
narcotics trafficking amounts to a similar liberty interest that would allow his new
attack on service despite the failure to raise it below. Petersen cites as support for
his ability to raise the issue State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802-803 (Utah 1990)
and State v. Beckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). Both cases coincide
only with Straley, not his own, because they involved persons whose actual liberty
1

The unpublished opinion is provided as Ex. C as being useful, authoritative, or
persuasive. See Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734 (Utah 2002).
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interests were at stake. In those rare cases the court properly allowed
consideration of issues not originally raised below. Petersen haphazardly attempts
to connect these true liberty interest cases to others that do not involve a liberty
interest at all, thus bootstrapping the notion that his new service of process
argument should be allowed fresh consideration. As discussed below, the
argument fails.
The State agrees that a deprivation of property ought to be accompanied by
process that is "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mulane v. Central Bank of
Hanover & Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). However, Mulane and other
cases cited by Petersen actually support the service of process conducted in this
case, while none of them stand for the proposition that the Petersen can raise his
new attack some seven years after the original trial proceeding.
In Mulane, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the court considered the service of process
of numerous beneficiaries to a common trust fund and found that mere publication
to persons whose addresses were actually known was not sufficient. The court
held that, as to the persons whose addresses were known, there was "no tenable
ground for dispensing with a serious effort to inform them personally of the
accounting, at least by ordinary mail to the record addresses." Id. at 318. It is
important to note that Mulane was not considering the issue for the first time on
appeal, yet it held that service by mail was sufficient. In this case, the State made
a serious effort, in accordance with statute, using certified mail sent to the
Petersen's correct and actual address of 626 North Colorado Street, where
14

Petersen acknowledges he was living at the time, which was returned after the
United States Postal Service left notice of the certified mail on three separate
occasions. (R. 25 & 41).
Additionally, in Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1990)
certi. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990), cited by Petersen, the court held that vehicle
owners were not deprived of their property without due process because the city
had mailed notice of its intention to remove and abate the vehicles. (A civil
judgment was awarded against the department for later entering the property,
breaking down a fence, and taking the cars, all without a warrant). Again, in
Conner the court did not consider the issue for the first time on appeal, but
ultimately found service by mail was sufficient. Id. at 1489-90.
The other cases Petersen relies upon are similarly distinguished. See
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 51 (1962) (issue not heard first on appeal,
involved confession of 14 year old murder suspect); Kentucky Dept. of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (issue not heard first on
appeal, involved procedures relating to visitation privileges of inmates); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 236-237 (1940) (issue was passed by jury, but heard by court,
involving confessions obtained against defendants sentenced to death.)
Taken together, Petersen's contention that drug forfeitures of real property
amounts to a deprivation of liberty interest that creates an exception to allow him
to raise new issues on appeal is unfounded. What is more, Utah case law, and
even the law cited by the Petersen, demonstrates that no liberty interest was
1^

involved in this case, while the original 1997 service of process was proper and
appropriate to the nature of the case. The trial court order denying the Second
Motion to Set Aside Judgment should therefore be affirmed.
POINT III
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD ALLOW PETERSEN'S NEW
ATTACK ON SERVICE BECAUSE THE RULE 4 SERVICE ISSUE
WAS NOT FUTILE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT AT
THE ORIGINAL TRIAL AND APPELLATE STAGES
Petersen's failure to raise his newly styled attack on service of process is
not an exceptional circumstance because the argument was not foreclosed at the
trial or appellate levels, and was not futile at any stage. As a general rule, courts
of appeal do not consider issues, to include constitutional issues, which are not
properly raised at the trial level. State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 278 FN5
(Utah Ct. App. 2001); State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
This case is different, even from these, because Petersen seeks to raise an issue
that was not, but could have been raised at both the trial and appellate court levels.
This request is at odds with case law, fairness, and res judicata.
In Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1994), relied upon by
Petersen, the court held that an exceptional circumstance existed to allow a
convicted person to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that gave a court
commissioner judicial authority of courts of record and the ultimate power of
entering final judgments and imposing sentence in contravention with article VIII
of the Utah Constitution. The Supreme Court, holding that such power did violate
1£

the Utah Constitution, noted that the issue was properly raised first on appeal
because, of course, the only way to challenge the statute was to have the case
heard by a commissioner, and then challenge that conviction. Id. Thus, an
exceptional circumstance actually existed in that case.
This case is nothing like Ohms because it was not futile for Petersen to
raise his new claim under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure at either the
trial or appellate levels. An analysis of Petersen's own argument proves the point.
Petersen contends that because the original complaint was filed under Utah Code
Annotated § 58-37-13(2)(k) (involving proceeds), service should be governed by §
58-37-13(9)(c), which Petersen contends is silent to service of the complaint, and
thus invokes Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While Petersen's
analysis is mistaken in that it ignores § 58-37-13(9)(d) and (f), which does address
service of complaints in civil in rem actions, the thrust of Petersen's own argument
demands that it be brought at both the trial level and original appellate level
because it involves the totality of the service of process under due process of law.
Indeed, to suggest that the trial court or the appellate could not consider these
issues stands against all reason because the Rule 4 argument itself is only a
corollary to the Notice of Intent to Seize issue, as already argued by Petersen
himself It therefore could not have been futile to raise the issue, and Petersen's
exceptional circumstance argument must fail.
What is more, there is no support in case law for the notion that parties may
fail to raise an issue at an appellate level, determine after an appellate ruling an
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entirely new route to take, then re-litigate starting at the trial court level some sixplus years after the original judgment, and then claim exceptional circumstances.
To do so would be a contravention of judicial economy and the appellate process,
just as the trial court found. It would encourage parties to engage in seemingly
endless litigation. It would cause prejudice to prevailing parties, in this case, for
example, by requiring the State to marshal antiquated evidence and witnesses for a
matter it prevailed upon nearly seven (7) years ago. Such a result frustrates
fairness and the great endeavor of justice, res judicata.
ISSUE IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PETERSEN'S
SECOND MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT BASING ITS DECISION
ON THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, TO INCLUDE PROPER
SERVICE, OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, AND APPELLATE REVIEW
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Petersen's second
motion to set aside judgment because service was and has been ruled proper,
Petersen had full opportunity to be heard, and the rulings of the trial court had
been affirmed. The minute opinion issued by the lower court, Judge Stephen L.
Henriod presiding, (Ex. A), demonstrates that the court was fully informed in the
premises before entering the order denying Petersen's second motion to set aside
judgment. That order was not an abuse of discretion, and it should stand.
A.

The Service Was Proper.

To begin, the service of process in this case was proper because it followed
the special service requirements set out by our legislature. Succinctly, even if this

1R

Court looks at the question of whether personal service of the complaint and
notice was required under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4, it should find that
personal service under Rule 4 was not necessary, and that service was in fact
proper. Under Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of
the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature,
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory
proceedings, except as governed by other rules promulgated by this
court or enacted by the Legislature ...
Id. (emphasis added). The Utah legislature recognized the quasi-criminal and
unique nature of civil in rem asset forfeitures cases brought under the Utah
Controlled Substances Act and promulgated a set of procedural requirements
specifically intended for these civil in rem cases. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4
was thus supplanted by the requirements of U.C.A. § 58-37-13 et. seq., to include
section 58-37-13(9) (d) and (f), governing service.
This procedural framework ensured that the State give adequate notice of
both the seizure of the property, and the intended forfeiture of the property, to all
non state-charged persons known to exist that might have an interest, by certified
mail. Under U.C.A. § 58-37-13(9) (f) no judgment could enter until after service
of the complaint was so made. Here, the required Notice and Complaint was
mailed, via certified mail, to Petersen's last known address, and was forwarded to,
and attempted to be delivered at, 626 North Colorado Street, the address at which
Petersen stated by affidavit was his residence from February 8, 1997 through June
23, 1997, the period the certified mail arrived. (R. 41). In words taken from
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Petersen's own brief, this service was "appropriate to the nature of the case." See
Mulane v. Central Bank of Hanover & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) and
Petersen's Brief at 19.
B.

This Court Held Service Was Proper and the New Issue Waived

This Court previously held that the service was proper and that the Rule 4
issue had been waived. See State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 278 (Utah Ct.
App. 2001). Specifically, this Court held that Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9), read
as a whole "confirms that the personal service provisions of the Notice apply only
to defendants in a state criminal prosecution, where the forfeiture is pursued as a
part of the criminal case." Id. It was here that this Court noted in FN5 of the
opinion the fact that it could not address the issue of whether the complaint and
summons had to be personally served under Rule 4 because Petersen had failed to
properly raise the argument. Id. The trial court, with this Court's decision in
hand, properly denied the Petersen's second motion to set aside judgment on the
very rationale given by this Court.
C.

The Original Judgment Is Fair and Should Stand

Finally, the default judgment was fair and should stand because Petersen
had an opportunity to be heard, and each ruling denying Petersen's motion(s) to
set aside judgment were not an abuse of discretion. While default judgments are
not generally favored, Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 611
P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980), the decision in Black's Title Inc. v. Utah State

on

Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) most closely
resembles this case, and is highly instructive.
In Black's Title, the Utah State Insurance Department initiated an
adjudicative proceeding against Black's business by mailing notice of the
proceeding via certified mail. Id. at 609. Despite efforts at locating Black, Black
asserted that he never received the mailings, and sought a motion to set aside
default judgment after he failed to answer. Id. Black could no longer earn an
income due to the ruling. Black moved to set aside the judgment under Utah Rule
of Procedure 60(b)(1) and (6). Id. at 610. In reviewing the denial of the motion to
set aside judgment, the Black's Title court noted that to be relieved, Black first had
to show the motion was timely and that he had a meritorious defense. Id. Black
did both of these, but the Court still affirmed the denial, stating that while "some
basis may exist to set aside the default[, we will not conclude the Commissioner]
abused [his] discretion in refusing to do so when the facts and circumstances
support the refusal." Id at 610 citing Katz, 732 P.2d at 93.
Here Petersen was similarly served with notice by certified mail. Here too
he claims he did not get it. But in this case Petersen has never shown that he
actually has a meritorious defense to the underlying complaint. See State ex rel
Utah State Dep't. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983).
What is more, a post-appeal motion to set aside judgment does not seem timely.
Added to these, the service was proper under the statute in this case and this Court
had affirmed the trial court's first denial of Petersen's first motions to set aside
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judgment. Under these circumstances, it is folly to suggest that the trial court
committed plain error, let alone that it abused its discretion. The ruling denying
Petersen's second motion to set aside judgment should therefore be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Petersen's service of process argument under Rule 4 is improperly before
this Court now as it was at the first appeal because it was waived for failure to
raise under Utah law. Moreover, a drug related forfeiture of real property does not
constitute deprivation of a liberty interest or exceptional circumstances such that
the issue may now be brought. To do so would invite litigation ad infinitum, and
strike at the heart of res judicata. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the second motion to set aside judgment where service of the
notice and complaint were proper under applicable statutes promulgated by our
legislature and this Court had already affirmed that the service was proper and that
the new issue was waived.
For the foregoing reasons the State respectfully asks that this Court affirm
the trial court order denying Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment, and renews its motion for summary disposition following plenary
consideration.
Dated this g>_ day of March, 2004.
DAVID E. YOCOM

Deputy District Attorney
•T)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I, Chad L. Piatt, hereby certify that I have caused to be handdelivered/mailed, first class postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing to Steven B. Wall, counsel for Appellant, this 2^ day of March, 2004,
at the address noted below:
Steven B. Wall
WALL & WALL
Counsel for Mr. Petersen
4460 South Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124

L. Piatt
Deputy District Attorney
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ADDENDUM A
(EX. A)

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 9709903755

ALL REAL PROPERTY, RESIDENCE &
APPURTENANCES LOCATED AT 736
NORTH COLORADO STREET, SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH
Defendant.

JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

Defendant's Second Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment is
before this Court for decision pursuant to a Notice To Submit filed
on February 11, 2 0 03.
On August 11, 1997 the court entered a default judgment of
forfeiture against defendant Peterson's property.

In response,

Peterson filed both a Motion To Set Aside the Judgment and a Motion
for Reconsideration.

Both motions were summarily denied.

On

September 28, 2001, Peterson filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah
Court of Appeals.

In an opinion issued on November 29, 2001, the

Court of Appeals ruled that the State's service of the notice of
seizure/intent to forfeit had been properly served on Peterson.
Furthermore, as to Peterson's argument that the State failed to
personally serve claimant, the appellate court concluded, citing to
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (h), that it was unable to address
that argument because Peterson had failed to raise the issue with
the Court below.
Now,

upon

consideration

of defendant's

second motion

for

default judgment, this Court rules, in accordance with the Utah

STATE OF UTAH V.
ALL REAL PROPERTY
ET. AL.

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

Court of Appeals, that Peterson's claim of defective service is
improperly before this Court because the issue was not originally
raised.

See, Watkiss & Campbell v Foa & Son 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah

1991)(holding defense of insufficiency of service of process is
waived for failure to raise) ; See also,

URCP 12 (b) (h) .

Here,

Peterson does not get the opportunity to raise certain issues with
the trial court, appeal the trial court's decision, lose on appeal
and then start over by bringing new issues in the district court.
To allow such actions would clearly be in contravention of judicial
economy as well as the appellate process.
For the above mentioned reasons, defendant's motion is hereby
denied. The State of Utah to prepare an Order consistent with this
Minute Entry.

BY THE COURT:

.\ ^

STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

-*

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 970903755 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

)S

day of

]V\C\(iCjr\

NAME
CHAD PLATT
ATTORNEY PLA
231 EAST 400 SOUTH SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
STEVEN B WALL
ATTORNEY DEF
4460 S HIGHLAND DRIVE
SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124
, 2p/^)'2^

Deputy Court Clerk

ADDENDUM B
(EX. B)

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CHAD L. PLATT, 8475
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

W i B DJST&CY COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR 2 8 2003
SALT LAKE C O U N T / I

H

9y,

Deput/Slerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vsALL REAL PROPERTY, RESIDENCE &
APPURTENANCES LOCATED AT 736
NORTH COLORADO STREET, SALT
LAKE, UTAH,

Case No. 9709003755
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod

Defendant.

Claimant Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment came before this Court
pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed February 11, 2003. Claimant Petersen is represented by
counsel, Steven B. Wall, and Plaintiff State of Utah is represented by counsel. The Court having
received and reviewed the various memoranda submitted, and being fully advised in the
premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

A Verified Complaint for forfeiture was filed against the defendant lot of property
on or about May 30, 1997.

2.

Plaintiff State of Utah served its Notice of Intent to Forfeit upon Claimant
Petersen by certified mail pursuant to the requirements of U.C.A. § 58-3713(9)(d).

3.

On August 11, 1997 this Court entered a default judgment of forfeiture against
Petersen's property.

4.

Petersen subsequently filed both a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and a Motion
for Reconsideration, which were summarily denied.

5.

Petersen filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals on September
28,2001.

6.

On November 29, 2001, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the State's service
of the Notice of Seizure and Notice of Intent to Forfeit had been properly served.
Further, specifically addressing Petersen's argument that he had not been
personally served, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded, citing to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(h), that is was unable to address that argument because
Petersen failed to raise it at the trial court.

7.

On February 28, 2002, following the Utah Court of Appeals decision which
affirmed the default judgment entered by this Court, Petersen filed a Second
Motion to Set Aside Judgment with this Court, again raising the insufficiency of
service of process argument that Petersen was not personally served.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Petersen's claim of defective service is improperly before this Court because the
issue was not originally raised, and is therefore waived. See Watkiss & Campbell
v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991)(holding defense of insufficiency of
service of process is waived for failure to raise); See also, URCP 12(b)(h).
7

2. To allow Petersen to re-start the action by bringing new issues in the district
court, after having the opportunity to raise issues at the trial and appellate levels,
would be in contravention of judicial economy and the appellate process. See
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991).

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Claimant Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment is DENIED.
DATED this

day of _ I/U^LA
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form and content:

Steven B. Wall
Attorney for Claimant, Petersen

1

,2003.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, were mailed, postage pre-paid, to Claimant
Petersen as addressed below, this _J\

day of March, 2003:

Steven B. Wall
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Claimant Petersen
4460 S. Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124

4

ADDENDUM C
(EX. C)

Not Reported in P 2d
2000 UT App 348
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atypical, significant deprivation in which a state
might conceivably create a liberty interest") Because
Straley did not allege a significant or atypical
hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison
life, the district court did not err in dismissing the
petition for failure to state a claim

Court of Appeals of Utah
Robert Dale STRALEY, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Hank GALETKA, Defendant and Appellant
No 990704-CA
Dec 7,2000
Robert Dale Straley, Draper, pro se
Ian Giaham and James H Beadles, Salt Lake City,
for appellee

Before JACKSON, BENCH, and DAVIS, JJ

MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM
*1 Appellant Robert Dale Straley appeals the
dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief The
district court dismissed the petition alleging violation
of due process in two separate disciplinary
proceedings that resulted in imposition of 30 days
and 15 days in punitive isolation The court
concluded that "the disciplinary actions did not result
in deprivation of a protected liberty interest"
"A prisoner's liberty interests may arise from either
the Due Process Clause itself or from state law "
Perkins v Kansas Dept of Corrections 165 F 3d
805, 808 (10th Cirl999) "State-created liberty
interests
are 'generally limited to freedom from
restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in
such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own
force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate m relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life' " Id (quoting San dm \
Connei M U J S 472 484 (1995)) Straley did not
allege in district court that the period of punitive
isolation imposed an "atypical and significant
hardship " See Sandm v Conna 59S U S 4 7 2, 486,
US S ( t 2293 2301 (1995) (holding 30 days in
segregated confinement "did not present the type of
Copr © West 2004 No Claim

Straley further contends that because a prison
disciplinary record may impact parole decisions
under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, a
liberty interest arises that must be protected by due
process He claims an October 15, 1998 decision of
the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole setting his case
for rehearing was based "solely" upon his prison
disciplinary record However, the rationale for the
decision listed seven aggravating factors, including
the prison disciplinary record, and three mitigating
factors Straley's claim is entirely speculative Sandin
suggested due process may be required if the sanction
imposed "will inevitably affect the duration of a
[prisoner's] sentence", however, the court found
nothing in Hawaii's laws that required its parole
board to grant or deny parole based upon misconduct,
although prison conduct was a relevant consideration
Id at 487 Accordingly, the court concluded "the
decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of
considerations," and "[t]he chance that a finding of
misconduct will alter the balance is simply too
attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the
Due Process Clause " Id Similarly, Utah statutes and
regulations do not mandate denial of parole based
upon a disciplinary record or require a grant of parole
based upon absence of a disciplinary record Straley's
disciplinary record was one of several factors noted
in the Board's rationale for setting the case for
rehearmg rather than grantmg parole The district
court properly concluded that Straley had not
demonstrated a basis to apply due process to his
prison disciplinary proceedings
*2 Accordmgly, we affirm the district court's
dismissal of the petition
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM D
(EX. D)

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE VII. §5
(1) The executive power of the state shall be vested in the Governor who shall see
that the laws are faithfully executed.
(2) The Governor shall transact all executive business with the officers of the
government, civil and military, and may require information in writing from the
officers of the Executive Department, and from the officers and managers of state
institutions upon any subject relating to the condition, management, and expenses
of their respective offices and institutions. The Governor may at any time when
the Legislature is not in session, if deemed necessary, appoint a committee to
investigate and report to the Governor upon the condition of any executive office
or state institution. I
(3) The Governor shall communicate by message the condition of the state to the
Legislature at every annual general session and recommend such measures as may
be deemed expedient.
(4) The Governor may appoint legal counsel to advise the Governor.
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
RULE 10(f). Deferral of ruling.
As to any issue raised by a motion for summary disposition, the court may defer
its ruling until plenary presentation and consideration of the case.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(a) Scope of Rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state
of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable
at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by
other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as
stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.

RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATES 58-37-13 (1996)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(2)
(2) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in them:
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter;
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing,
or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property
described in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including
capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for
use to administer controlled substances in violation of this chapter;
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended
for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in
Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b), except that:

(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited
under this section unless the owner or other person in charge of the
conveyance was a consenting party or knew or had reason to know
of the violation of this chapter;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's
knowledge or consent; and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance is subject to the claim of an
interest holder who did not know or have reason to know after the
exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take
place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes,
and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange
for a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, and all moneys,
negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of this chapter. An interest in property may not be
forfeited under this subsection unless it is proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the interest holder knew, had reason to know of, or consented
to the conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture. The burden of
presenting this evidence shall be upon the state;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-2,
Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating,
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled
substances in violation of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or
interest in real property is subject to the claim of an interest holder
who did not know or have reason to know after the exercise of
reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the
property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection
if the interest holder did not know or have reason to know of the
conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not
willingly consent to the conduct; and
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under
this subsection unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on
the property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or
the street value of any controlled substances found on the premises

at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer
experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to
establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of
this subsection;
(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in relation
to a violation of this chapter or any firearm, weapon, or ammunition kept or
located within the proximity of controlled substances or other property
subject to forfeiture under this section; and
(k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter. There is a
rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and currency found in
proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug manufacturing
equipment or supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable
records of importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled
substances are proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter. The burden
of proof is upon the claimant of the property to rebut this presumption.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(9)(a - f)
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows:
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j), a complaint
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district,
the district attorney, or the attorney general, and
filed in a court of record where the property was seized or is to be seized. In
cases in which the claimant of the property is also charged as a criminal
defendant, the complaint shall be filed in the county where the criminal
charges arose, regardless of the location of the property. The complaint
shall include:
(i) a description of the property which is subject to forfeiture;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and
(iii) the allegations of conduct which gives rise to forfeiture.
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a criminal defendant, the
forfeiture shall proceed as part of the criminal prosecution as an in
personam action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to
forfeiture. A defendant need not file a written answer to the complaint, but
may acknowledge or deny interest in the property at the time of first
appearance on the criminal charges. If a criminal information or indictment
is amended to include a demand for forfeiture, the defendant may respond
to the demand at the time of the amendment.
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by the defendant, the
determination of forfeiture shall be stayed until resolution of the
criminal charges. Hearing on the forfeiture shall be before the court
without a jury. The court may consider any evidence presented in the

criminal case, and receive any other evidence offered by the state or
the defendant. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the
evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or release of the
property as it determines.
(ii) A defendant may move the court to transfer the forfeiture action,
to stay all action, including discovery, in the forfeiture, or for
hearing on the forfeiture any time prior to trial of the criminal
charges. Either party may move the court to enter a finding of
forfeiture as to defendant's interest in part or all of the property,
either by default or by stipulation. Upon entry of a finding, the court
shall stay the entry of judgment until resolution of the criminal
charges. Any finding of forfeiture entered by the court prior to
resolution of the criminal charges may not constitute a separate
judgment, and any motion for disposition, stay, severance, or
transfer of the forfeiture action may not create a separate proceeding.
Upon the granting of a motion by the defendant for disposition, stay,
severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action, the defendant shall be
considered to have waived any claim that the defendant has been
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense,
(iii) Any other person claiming an interest in property subject to
forfeiture under this subsection may not intervene in a trial or appeal
of
a complaint filed under this subsection. Following the entry of an in
personam forfeiture order, or upon the filing of a petition for release
under Subsection (e), the county attorney, district attorney, or
attorney general may proceed with a separate in rem action to
resolve any other claims upon the property subject to forfeiture,
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection (2)(k) shall be
prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the
district attorney, or by the attorney general, either in personam as part of a
criminal prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem action against the
property alleged to be proceeds, and filed in the county where the property
is seized or encumbered, if the proceeds are located outside the state. A
finding that property is the proceeds of a violation of this chapter does not
require proof that the property is the proceeds of any particular exchange or
transaction. Proof that property is proceeds may be shown by evidence
which establishes all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) that the person has engaged in conduct in violation of this
chapter;
(ii) that the property was acquired by the person during that period
when the conduct in violation of this chapter occurred or within a
reasonable time after that period; and

(iii) that there was no likely source for the property other than
conduct in
violation of the chapter.
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the clerk
of the court, and served upon all persons known to the county attorney or
district attorney to have a claim in the property by:
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is charged in a criminal
information or indictment; and
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is known
or to each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in the
Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given upon the records of
the division, which service is considered complete even though the
mail is refused or cannot be forwarded. The county attorney, district
attorney, or attorney general shall make one publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was
made for all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who
are believed to have an interest in the property.
(e) Except under Subsection (9)(a) in personam actions, any claimant or
interest holder shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint
within 20 days after service. When property is seized under this chapter,
any interest holder or claimant of the property, prior to being served with a
complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court having
jurisdiction for release of his interest in the property. The petition shall
specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney or, if within a
prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the seizure, who
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a
complaint of forfeiture.
(f) For civil action in rem, after 20 days following service of a complaint or
petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is
no file, the court shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to
present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of of
the property as the court determines. If the county attorney or district
attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the court
determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery
of the property, it shall enter an order directing the county attorney or
district attorney to answer the petition within ten days. If no answer is filed
within that period, the court shall order release of the property to the
petitioner entitled to receive it.

